



**GUIDANCE NOTES ON THE PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF  
MONEY LAUNDERING, TERRORIST FINANCING AND PROLIFERATION FINANCING  
IN THE CAYMAN ISLANDS**

**PART IX**

**SECTOR SPECIFIC GUIDANCE:  
VIRTUAL ASSET SERVICE PROVIDERS**

This purpose of Part IX of the Guidance Notes is to provide guidance for virtual asset service providers ("VASPs") that require further explanation on issues than are dealt with in the general body of these Guidance Notes. This section must be read in conjunction with Part I and Part II of the Guidance Notes and the Appendices.

## SECTION 1

### VIRTUAL ASSET SERVICE PROVIDERS

#### A. OVERVIEW

1. This guidance is issued to assist registered or licensed Virtual Asset Service Providers ("VASPs") in better understanding and fully implementing their obligations as it relates to anti-money laundering/countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT).
2. Schedule 6 of the PoCL lists activities falling within the definition of 'relevant financial business' which includes 'providing virtual asset services'.
3. The Virtual Asset (Service Providers Law), 2020 (VASP Law) provides a framework for the conduct of virtual asset business in the Islands, the registration and licensing of persons providing virtual asset services and for incidental and connected purposes.
4. Sections 9(3)(d) and (e) of the VASP Law provides that all VASPs:

*"must comply with the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations (2020 Revision) and other laws relating to the combating of money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing; and*

*for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations (2020 Revision), put in place anti-money laundering systems and procedures".*

Both the VASP Law and PoCL define the terms "virtual asset" and "virtual asset service" in a similar manner. The VASP Law also defines the terms "virtual asset service provider", "virtual asset custodian", "virtual asset custody service", "virtual asset trading platform" and "virtual asset issuance".

#### B. SCOPE

1. The sector specific guidance contained in this section seeks to provide practical assistance to VASPs in complying with the AMLRs, interpreting and applying the general provisions of these Guidance Notes, and for VASPs to adopt sound risk management and internal controls for their operations. The Monetary Authority expects all VASPs to take account of this guidance and to fully comply with the obligations set out in the PoCL and the AMLRs.
2. The AMLRs have been extended to entities providing virtual asset services as defined in the VASP Law and the PoCL. This is regardless of what technology is used by the VASP to conduct the virtual asset activities, and whether the VASP uses a decentralised or centralised platform, smart contract, or some other mechanism.
3. It is the responsibility of each VASP to have systems and training in place to prevent ML/TF/PF. This means that each VASP must maintain identification, verification and ongoing monitoring procedures, record-keeping procedures, and

such other procedures and controls appropriate for the purposes of forestalling and preventing ML/TF/PF.

4. In accordance with the VASP Law, the term VASPs includes the following types of persons:
  - (1) Virtual asset exchange platforms;
  - (2) Virtual Assets Custodians such as wallet service providers;
  - (3) Virtual asset issuers, whether registered or licensed; and
  - (4) Professionals that participate in or provide, financial services related to virtual asset issuance or the sale of a virtual asset.  
Existing licensees conducting virtual asset services (including virtual asset custodial services, virtual asset trading platform services and virtual asset issuance)
5. Closed-loop items are not captured in the Guidance Notes. Such items are non-transferable, non-exchangeable and non-refundable such as credit card awards, or similar loyalty program rewards or points, which an individual cannot sell onward in a secondary market.
6. The PoCL and VASP Law do not seek to regulate the technology that underlies VA but rather the persons that may use technology or software applications to conduct, as a business, virtual assets services on behalf of a natural or legal person. A person who develops or sells either a software application of a new virtual asset platform (i.e. a software developer) therefore does not constitute a VASP when solely developing or selling the application or platform, but they may be a VASP if they also use the new application or platform to engage as a business in exchanging or transferring funds or virtual assets or conducting any of the other financial activities on behalf of another natural or legal person.
7. Further, the PoCL and VASP law do not aim to capture natural or legal persons that provide ancillary services or products to a virtual asset network, including hardware wallet manufacture and non-custodial wallets, to the extent that they do not also engage in or facilitate as a business any of the aforementioned VA activities on behalf of their customers.

### **C. FACTORS THAT GIVE RISE TO MONEY LAUNDERING, TERRORIST FINANCING, AND PROLIFERATION FINANCING RISKS**

#### *Privacy and Anonymity:*

1. VAs due to their features and characteristics, have a higher ML/TF/PF risk associated with them. VASPs should be aware that a significant proportion of virtual assets held or used in a transaction may be associated with privacy-enhancing features or products and services that potentially obfuscate transaction or activities and inhibit a VASP's ability to know its customers and implement CDD and other effective AML/CFT measures, such as:
  - a) Mixers or tumblers;
  - b) Anonymity Enhanced Currencies (AEC)
  - c) Obfuscated ledger technology;
  - d) Internet Protocol (IP) anonymizers;
  - e) Ring signatures;
  - f) Stealth addresses;
  - g) Ring confidential transactions;
  - h) Atomic swaps;

- i) Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs;
  - j) Privacy coins; and
  - k) A significant proportion of the virtual assets held or used in a transaction is associated with third party escrow services;
- 2. VAs can enable non-face-to-face business relationships and can be used to quickly move funds globally to facilitate a range of financial activities—from money or value transfer services to securities, commodities or derivatives-related activity, among others. Risk-based scrutiny of customers and transactions should be applied in accordance with the type of business conducted and the value and volume of transactions. VASPs should consider utilizing a range of monitoring and digital footprint tools to mitigate risks such as; undertaking an analysis of the relevant blockchain, for the purpose of assessing any nexus to sources of risk, including the darknet and blacklisted addresses, particularly where the risk is significant or the volume of transactions is substantial.

*Decentralised Nature of VASPs business models:*

- 3. VASPs business models can be centralized or decentralized. Where it is decentralised, there is no central server or service provider that has overall responsibility for identifying users, monitoring transactions, reporting suspicious activity and acting as a contact point for law enforcement. Consequently, individuals and transactions may not be subject to risk assessment and mitigation processes equivalent to those required by AML/CTF regulation. Where VASPs deal with funds originating from decentralised systems, risk-based mitigation measures, such as blockchain analysis, should be applied.

*Cross Border Nature:*

- 4. VASPs' connections and links to multiple jurisdictions may give rise to ML/TF/PF risks. VASPs will need to ensure that they are able to effectively apply all AML/CTF processes in the jurisdictions in which they operate and compensate for any additional risk introduced by the cross-border nature of a transaction on a risk-sensitive basis.

*Segmentation:*

- 5. The infrastructure used to operate a virtual asset trading platform, make transfers and execute payments may be complex and may involve several entities in different jurisdictions. This increases the risk through partial oversight of virtual asset systems and may hinder access to relevant actors by law enforcement. In such instances, VASPs should seek to work together with other parties in the value chain so as to compensate for segmentation and provide a more robust AML/CTF framework. VASPs working with outsourced service providers or agents will retain responsibility for AML/CTF compliance by outsourced service providers and agents.

*Acceptability, Immutability and Convertibility:*

- 6. A wide availability of points of acceptance of virtual assets to conduct transactions, the ability to exchange virtual assets into money or other virtual assets makes it harder to track transactions and gives rise to new types of financial crime not associated with traditional payment and financial services products including the

risk of money laundering. While there is no single mitigation control, a number of measures may be employed to mitigate the arising risks including documenting and tracking financial crime typologies to address these risks.

7. Once a transaction has been validated, the record cannot easily be altered. This makes it more difficult for misappropriated virtual assets to be retrieved. Consumers should be made aware of such risks to minimise the likelihood of accidental loss.

*Operational structure:*

8. VASPs should take into account their operational structure in seeking to assess and mitigate risks in their operations. These include:
  - (a) Whether the VASP operates entirely online (e.g. platform-based exchanges) or in person (e.g. trading platforms that facilitate peer-to-peer exchanges or kiosk-based exchanges);
  - (b) The nature and scope of the VA account, product, or service (e.g., small value savings and storage accounts that primarily enable financially-excluded customers to store limited value);
  - (c) The nature and scope of the VA payment channel or system (e.g., open- versus closed-loop systems or systems intended to facilitate micro-payments or government-to-person/person-to-government payments); and
  - (d) Any parameters or measures in place that may potentially lower the provider's (whether a VASP or other obliged entity that engages in VA activities or provides VA products and services) exposure to risk (e.g., limitations on transactions or account balance).
9. The following are specific higher-risk factors that VASPs should have regard to, in addition to the higher-risk classification factors set out in Section 3D of Part II of these Guidance Notes:
  - (a) The ability of users to:
    - (i) make or accept payments in money from/to unknown or un-associated third parties;
    - (ii) operate more than one account with the provider;
    - (iii) operate accounts on behalf of third parties;
  - (b) The customer:
    - (i) Is involved in virtual asset mining operations (either directly or indirectly through relationships with third parties) that take place in a high-risk jurisdiction, relate to higher-risk virtual assets (such as privacy coins) or where its organisation gives rise to higher risk;
    - (ii) Uses VPN, TOR, encrypted, anonymous or randomly generated email or a temporary email service;
    - (iii) Requests an exchange to or from cash, privacy coins or anonymous electronic money;
    - (iv) Sends virtual assets to a newly created address;
    - (v) Persistently avoids thresholds through smaller transactions;

- (vi) Sends or receives virtual assets to/from peer-to-peer exchanges, or funds/withdraws money without using the platform's other features;
    - (vii) Exploits technological glitches or failures to his advantage;
  - (c) The virtual asset comes from, or is associated with, the darknet or other illegal/high-risk sources, such as an unregulated exchange, or is associated with market abuse, ransom ware, hacking, fraud, Ponzi schemes, sanctioned bitcoin addresses or gambling sites.
10. The following are specific low risk classification factors VASPs may consider (in addition to the factors set out in Section 3D of Part II of these Guidance Notes):
- (a) A low-risk nature and scope of the account, product, or service (e.g., small value savings and storage accounts that primarily enable financially-excluded customers to store limited value);
  - (b) Product parameters or measures that lower the provider's exposure to risk, such as limitations on transactions or account balance;
  - (c) The customer requests an exchange and either the source of or destination for the money is the customer's own account with a bank in a jurisdiction assessed by the VASP as low risk;
  - (d) The customer requests an exchange and either the source of or destination for the virtual asset is the customer's own wallet that has been whitelisted or otherwise determined as low-risk;
  - (e) The customer requests an exchange and either the source of or destination for the virtual asset relates to low value payments for goods and services; and
  - (f) The results of a blockchain analysis indicate a lower risk.

## **D. RISK MANAGEMENT**

### *Risk Assessment*

1. Prior to engaging in VASP activities, VASPs must carry out a comprehensive and detailed risk assessment associated with the relevant technology, product, or business practice associated with virtual assets.
2. The obligation to conduct such a risk assessment is enshrined in Sections 8 and 9 of the AMLRs, which require persons carrying out relevant financial business to take steps, appropriate to the nature and size of the business, to identify, assess, and understand its ML/TF risks in relation to customers, geographic region, products, services or transactions, and delivery channels, and to undertake such a risk assessment in relation to new products and business practices, new delivery channels, and new or developing technologies prior to their launch.
  - a. *Customer risk:*
    - (i) A customer's business and risk profile will determine the level and type of ongoing monitoring necessary and support the VASP's decision whether to enter into, continue, or terminate the business relationship. Risk profiles can apply at the customer level (e.g., nature and

volume of trading activity, origin of virtual funds deposited, etc.) or at a cluster level, where a cluster of customers display homogenous characteristics (e.g., clients conducting similar types of transactions or involving the same virtual asset).

(ii) VASPs should periodically update customer risk profiles of business relationships in order to apply the appropriate level of CDD including ongoing monitoring. Monitoring transactions involves identifying changes to the customer's business and risk profile (e.g., the customer's behaviour, use of products, and the amounts involved) and keeping it up to date, which may require the application of Enhanced Due Diligence measures.

(iii) As part of its ongoing monitoring, a VASP should screen its customer's and counterparty's wallet addresses against any available blacklisted wallet addresses that countries might have made available. If there is a positive hit, the VASP should determine whether additional mitigating or preventive actions are warranted, and where necessary not establish or continue the business relations.

- b. *Product risk*: The features of the service offered as well as the virtual asset which customers may hold, store, transfer or exchange determine the overall risk associated with the product. Any changes to the service or virtual assets offered should be assessed for their impact on risk prior to their introduction. (See also Section 3G of Part II of these Guidance Notes on risk assessment in relation to the use or development of new products).
- c. *Transaction risk*: The risk of a transaction is established by analysing the blockchain to obtain transaction information. The transaction is scored for its risk by investigating the provenance of the relevant virtual assets establishing the time that has elapsed since any higher-risk event and the proportion of higher-risk VAs within the transaction. Blockchain analysis (also called blockchain tracing) is sometimes outsourced to an external service provider. However, outsourcing does not remove the VASP's responsibility under the AMLRs, and VASPs should ensure that they undertake due diligence on the outsourced service provider when integrating that service into their business activities. Whether to employ blockchain analysis, the degree of analysis and the use of third parties should be decided using a risk-based approach.

- d. *Geographical risk*: Geographical risk relates both to the customer's place of establishment and the provenance of the virtual asset. Where information about the destination of funds is collected, this will also inform the assessment of geographical risk. Apart from the requirements relating to transactions and relationships involving high-risk third countries, VASPs should take into account publicly available information about the regulatory treatment and use of virtual assets in particular jurisdictions to assess geographical risk.
  - e. *Delivery channel risk*: The risks related to how customers access a VASP's products or platform need to be considered. For example, whether they are only accessible online or whether physical infrastructures are being used.
- 3. As part of its risk assessment, VASPs should determine whether the relevant risks, discussed above, can be appropriately mitigated and managed. In line with Section 8 of the AMLRs, the risk assessment must be documented, kept current, and be kept in a way that it is readily available to the Monetary Authority and other competent authorities under the PoCL.

*Risk Mitigation: AML/CFT Internal Controls*

- 1. Pursuant to Section 8(2)(e) of the AMLRs, VASPs are required to implement policies, controls and procedures that enable them to manage and mitigate the risks that have been identified either at the national level through the NRA or by the VASP itself through its business risk assessment as set out in Chapter C, and to have such policies, controls and procedures approved by senior management. Such internal controls must be adequate to ensure proper risk management across the VASP's operations, departments, branches and subsidiaries, both domestically and, where relevant, abroad, and include appropriate governance arrangements where responsibility for AML/CFT is clearly allocated and a compliance officer is appointed at management level; controls to monitor the integrity of staff; ongoing training of staff; and an independent audit function to test the system.
- 2. In terms of operations, and in particular the conduct of transactions, control measures that may be employed (in addition to those outlined at section 3E of Part II of these Guidance Notes) include:
  - (a) Transaction limits, including limits on the total value of virtual assets that may be held, stored, transferred or exchanged;
  - (b) Time delays before certain automated and manual transactions can be carried out with a view to restrict the rapid movement of funds, where the delay implemented will depend on the product in question and associated risk typologies; and
  - (c) The prohibition of transfers of money to third parties (i.e., the name on source and destination accounts must match where money is exchanged for virtual assets or virtual assets for money).



3. The internal policies, controls and procedures must furthermore address the various topics detailed in Section 5 of the AMLRs, which include:
  - (a) Customer due diligence (CDD) measures;
  - (b) Related Measures for CDD such as Know Your Customer (KYC), Source of Funds etc;
  - (c) Record keeping;
  - (d) Implementation of targeted financial sanctions; and
  - (e) Internal and SAR procedures.

## **E. CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE**

1. It is important to note who is the customer for the purposes of implementing CDD as it pertains to the use of virtual assets. For virtual asset trading platforms, the customer is generally the person requesting the exchange, regardless of the means of doing so. For custodian service providers, the customer is generally the person on behalf of whom they hold, or transfer a virtual asset. For issuers, the person who is purchasing the newly created virtual asset.
2. Pursuant to Sections 10 to 20 of the AMLRs, VASPs must apply the full set of CDD measures, including identification and verification measures in relation to customers and beneficial owners, obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship, and to conduct ongoing CDD throughout the lifespan of the business relationship.
3. Regardless of the nature of the relationship or transaction, VASPs must have in place effective procedures to identify and verify the identity of a customer, including when establishing business relations with that customer; where VASPs may have suspicions of ML/TF/PF, regardless of any exemption of thresholds; and where they have doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained identification data.
4. Pursuant to Section 12 of the AMLRs, VASPs and other related parties should collect the relevant CDD information on their customers when they provide services to or engage in virtual asset activities on behalf of their customers, including information on the customer's name and further identifiers such as physical address, date of birth, and a unique national identifier number (e.g., national identity number or passport number). As stipulated in Section 12 of the AMLRs, VASPs are also required to collect additional information to assist in verifying the customer's identity when establishing the business relationship at onboarding, authenticate the identity of customers, determine the customer's business and risk profile and conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship. Such information could include, for example an IP address with an associated time stamp; geo-location data; device identifiers; wallet addresses; and transaction hashes. VASPs may also match a customer's addresses against a list of blacklisted addresses on popular blockchains, e.g. addresses that have been misused or have been found to have been used by malicious individuals. The VASP should also seek to determine the provenance of a virtual asset e.g. if it has been moved from a blacklisted address recently.
5. In cases where a VASP carries out a one-off transaction, the designated threshold above which VASPs are required to conduct CDD is KYD 10,000, in

accordance with Section 11 of the AMLRs. International best practices set out by the FATF call for VASPs to conduct CDD for any one-off transaction above USD/EUR 1,000 or equivalent. While this is not yet a legal requirement in Cayman Islands, adoption of best practices is recommended.

6. Pursuant to Section 18 and Section 19 of the AMLRs, if a VASP is unable to obtain customer information, the transaction should not proceed and the VASP should consider filing a SAR to the FRA.
7. As prescribed in Sections 27 and 28 of the AMLRs, where the ML/TF risk is higher based on the existence of any of the circumstances listed in Section 27 of the AMLRs, EDD measures must be taken. For example, VA transfers from or associated with countries with significant levels of organised crime, corruption, terrorist or other criminal activity, including source or transit countries for illegal drugs, human trafficking, smuggling, and illegal gambling, or countries subject to sanctions or embargos, or countries with weak governance, law enforcement and regulatory regimes may present higher risks for ML and TF. Other indicators may be risk factors associated with the VA product, service, transaction, or delivery channel, including whether the activity involves pseudonymous or anonymous transactions, non-face-to-face business relationships or transactions, and/or payments received from unknown or un-associated third parties.
8. EDD measures that may mitigate the potentially higher risks associated with the factors mentioned in Section 27 of the AMLR include:
  - a. corroborating the identity information received from the customer, such as a national identity number, with information in third-party databases or other reliable sources;
  - b. tracing the customer's IP address;
  - c. searching the Internet for corroborating information consistent with the customer's transaction profile;
  - d. obtaining additional information on the customer and intended nature of the business relationship;
  - e. obtaining information on the source of funds of the customer;
  - f. obtaining information on the reasons for intended or performed transactions; and
  - g. conducting enhanced monitoring of the relationship.
9. VASPs should also apply the requirements of Part VII AMLR on Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).

## **F. RELATED MEASURES FOR CDD**

### **1. KYC**

- a. KYC includes identifying and verifying the customer's identity, assessing the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship or transaction and identifying and taking reasonable measures to verify the identity of beneficial owners.
- b. The information collected as part of the KYC process may include wallet addresses and transaction hashes.

- c. Where multiple VASPs are involved in one transaction, it may be helpful to develop reliance or outsourcing agreements on a bilateral basis in order to minimise duplication of KYC processes and improve the customer experience.

## 2. **Blockchain Analysis**

- a. Blockchain analysis processes are additional to KYC processes and take account of the unique opportunities afforded to virtual asset exchange providers and virtual asset custodians by the blockchain. Blockchain analysis helps these providers to assess the risk of transactions. VASPs should consider how blockchain analysis may be appropriate to apply in line with a risk-based approach, including taking into account the nature of the business of the exchange provider and whether it would be appropriate to use it for all transactions.

## 3. **Source of Funds**

- a. Evidence of the source of funds must be collected with respect to all transactions that present a higher risk, including those that involve:
  - An exchange of virtual assets for money or vice versa;
  - An exchange of one virtual asset for another if the customer claims the virtual asset has been obtained through mining; and
  - The transfer of a customer's virtual assets from one exchange to another.

For transactions carried out under a business relationship, this evidence may only need to be collected once.

- b. It is good practice to collect information about the destination of funds in order to inform the assessment of risk (e.g., geographical risk) and aid transaction monitoring processes. Where a recipient's name has been collected, sanctions obligations apply in the usual way.

## 4. **Ongoing Monitoring**

- a. Monitoring transactions is an essential component in identifying transactions that are potentially suspicious (as discussed at sections 3F and 16 of Part II of these Guidance Notes) including in the context of virtual asset transactions. Transactions that do not fit the behaviour expected from a customer profile, or that deviate from the usual pattern of transactions, may be potentially suspicious.
- b. Monitoring should be carried out on a continuous basis and may also be triggered by specific transactions. Where large volumes of transactions occur on a regular basis, automated systems may be the only realistic method of monitoring transactions, and flagged transactions should go through expert analysis to determine if such transactions are suspicious. VASPs and other related entities should understand their operating rules, verify their integrity on a regular basis, and check that they account for the identified ML/TF risks associated with virtual assets, products or services or activities.

- c. Monitoring under a risk-based approach allows VASPs and other related entities to create monetary or other thresholds to determine which activities will be reviewed. Defined situations or thresholds used for this purpose should be reviewed on a regular basis to determine their adequacy for the risk levels established.

## **H. RECORD KEEPING**

1. VASPs are to maintain records on transactions and information obtained through CDD measures in line with Part VIII of the AMLRs, which shall include: information relating to the identification of the relevant parties, the public keys (or equivalent identifiers), addresses or accounts involved (or equivalent identifiers), the nature and date of the transaction, and the amount transferred.
2. The public information on the blockchain or other relevant distributed ledger of a particular virtual asset may provide a beginning foundation for record keeping, provided VASPs and third party entities can adequately identify their customers. However, reliance solely on the blockchain or other type of distributed ledger underlying the virtual asset for recordkeeping is not sufficient. For example, the information available on the blockchain or other type of distributed ledger may enable relevant authorities to trace transactions back to a wallet address, though may not readily link the wallet address to the name of an individual. Additional information and procedures will therefore be necessary to associate the address to a private key controlled by a natural or legal person.

## **I. IMPLEMENTATION OF TARGETED FINANCIAL SANCTIONS**

1. VASPs are under a clear obligation to freeze without delay the funds or other assets (including VAs) of designated persons or entities and to ensure that no funds or other assets are made available to or for the benefit of designated persons or entities in relation to the targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism or terrorist financing, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Please refer to Section 13 of Part II of the Guidance Notes for more information on sanctions.
2. VASPs should be aware that some sanction lists may now include information on wallet numbers in addition to/instead of names.

## **J. INTERNAL AND SAR REPORTING PROCEDURES**

1. VASPs should have the ability to flag for further analysis any unusual or suspicious movements of funds or transactions or activity that is otherwise indicative of potential involvement in illicit activity regardless of whether the transactions or activities are fiat-to-fiat, virtual-to-virtual, fiat-to-virtual, or virtual-to-fiat in nature.
2. VASPs and their related entities should have appropriate systems so that such funds or transactions are scrutinised in a timely manner and a determination can be made as to whether funds or transactions are suspicious. Pursuant to Section 19 of the AMLRs, VASPs must promptly report suspicions of ML/TF to the FRA, including those involving or relating to VAs and/or providers that are suspicious.

3. Some indicators of unusual or suspicious activities related to VAs are:

*(a) In Relation to Transactions:*

- (i) Structuring VA transactions (e.g. exchange or transfer) in small amounts under record-keeping or reporting thresholds, similar to structuring cash transactions or making multiple high-value transactions (1) in a staggered and regular pattern, with no further transactions recorded during a long period afterwards, which is particularly common in ransom ware-related cases; or (2) to a newly created or to a previously inactive account.
- (ii) Transferring virtual assets immediately to multiple VASPs, especially to VASPs registered or operating in another jurisdiction where there is no relation to where the customer lives or there is a non-existent or weak AML/CFT regulation.
- (iii) Accepting/depositing funds from VA addresses that have been identified as holding stolen funds, or VA addresses linked to the holders of stolen funds.
- (iv) Depositing VAs at an exchange and then immediately withdrawing the VAs from a VASP immediately to a private wallet. This effectively turns the exchange/VASP into an ML mixer.
- (v) Converting a large amount of fiat currency into VAs, or a large amount of one type of VA into other types of VAs with no logical business explanation.

*(b) In relation to Anonymity:*

- (i) The services of a VASP serve to generate anonymity.
- (ii) The VAs have a history (above average) of one or more mixers or trade history on the Dark web.
- (iii) Moving a VA that operates on a public, transparent blockchain, such as Bitcoin, to a centralised exchange and then immediately trading it for an AEC or privacy coin.
- (iv) VAs transferred to or from wallets that show previous patterns of activity associated with the use of VASPs that operate mixing or tumbling services or P2P platforms.
- (v) Funds deposited or withdrawn from a VA address or wallet with direct and indirect exposure links to known suspicious sources, including darknet marketplaces, mixing/tumbling services, questionable gambling sites, illegal activities (e.g. ransomware) and/or theft reports.

*(c) In relation to Customers (whether sender or receiver):*

- (i) Creating separate accounts under different names to circumvent restrictions on trading or withdrawal limits imposed by VASPs.
- (ii) Incomplete or insufficient CDD information, or a customer declines requests for CDD documents or inquiries regarding source of funds.
- (iii) A customer's VA address appears on public forums associated with illegal activity.

- (iv) A customer significantly older than the average age of platform users opens an account and engages in large numbers of transactions, suggesting their potential role as a VA money mule or a victim of elder financial exploitation.
- (v) A customer frequently changes his or her identification information, including email addresses, IP addresses, or financial information, which may also indicate account takeover against a customer.
- (vi) Bulk of a customer's source of wealth is derived from investments in VAs, ICOs, or fraudulent ICOs, etc.

(d) *In relation to Geographical risks:*

- (i) Customer's funds originate from, or are sent to, an exchange that is not registered in the jurisdiction where either the customer or exchange is located.
- (ii) Customer sends funds to VASPs operating in jurisdictions that have no VA regulation, or have not implemented AML/CFT controls.

4. In the context of virtual asset issuers and ICOs, factors that could give rise to suspicious activity are:
  - a) An ICO-project does not display team members, company information nor physical address. Team members do not have a social media profile.
  - b) An ICO-project is trying to hide the amount of funds raised, by providing misleading, incomplete or suspicious information on their website or not providing proof of investments.
  - c) An ICO-project either has no cap as to the amount of money required to develop its product or has set an extremely high cap.
  - d) There is a guarantee of high returns that seems impossible to fulfil.
  - e) An ICO-project has lack of information on the project or lack of detail on how the technology works, there is no well-designed website.
  - f) There are no development goals on a clear timeline.
  - g) The ICO intends to convert a portion of the raised funds to fiat.
  - h) The virtual currency has anonymity features that aid in the commission of illegal activity, services or transactions.
5. The above noted indicators (at paras 3 and 4) are neither exhaustive nor applicable in every situation. Indicators should be considered in the context of other characteristics about the customer and relationship, or a logical business explanation. For more information on red flag indicators, see FATF Report on Virtual Assets Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (September 2020).
6. Where a VASP detects suspicious activity, in relation to an incoming transfer of virtual assets from an external party that cannot be stopped due to processes associated with the blockchain, steps should be taken restrict the actions that can be performed by its customer in relation to the suspicious funds, freeze the assets/funds (where possible) and report the suspicious activity.
7. VASPs should, where possible, implement the necessary controls to hold incoming virtual assets deemed suspicious and ensure that they are not released to their customers

## **K. IDENTIFICATION AND RECORD-KEEPING FOR VIRTUAL ASSET TRANSFERS**

1. When engaging in or providing services related to transfers of VAs in or from within Cayman Islands, VASPs are expected to collect and record information as follows:
  - a) Originating VASPs should obtain and hold accurate originator and beneficiary information on virtual asset transfers, submit this information to the beneficiary VASP or financial institution (if any) immediately and securely, and make it available on request to appropriate authorities;
  - b) Beneficiary VASPs should obtain and hold required originator information and required and accurate beneficiary information on virtual asset transfers and make it available on request to appropriate authorities.
2. Information to be collected, maintained and recorded include the:
  - a) originator's name (i.e., the sending customer) and the name of the beneficiary;
  - b) where an account is used to process the transfer of virtual assets by —
    - (i) the originator, the account number of the originator; or
    - (ii) the beneficiary, the account number of the beneficiary;
  - c) the address of the originator/beneficiary, the number of a Government issued document evidencing the originator's/beneficiary's identity or the originator's/beneficiary's customer identification number or date and place of birth; and
  - d) where an account is not used to process the transfer of virtual assets, the unique transaction reference number that permits traceability of the transaction.
3. VASPs are expected to keep records of complete information on the originator and beneficiary which accompanies each transfer of virtual assets for at least five years.
4. VASPs should submit the required information simultaneously or concurrently with the transfer.
5. Other requirements such as monitoring of the availability of information and taking freezing action and prohibiting transactions with designated persons and entities also apply. The same obligations apply to financial institutions when sending or receiving virtual asset transfers on behalf of a customer.