

SUMMARY OF PRIVATE SECTOR CONSULTATION AND FEEDBACK STATEMENT Rule on Corporate Governance for Regulated Entities

| No. | Section | Comments | Authority's Response | Consequent Amendments to the Proposed Measure |
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| | | SECTION-S | PECIFIC COMMENTS | |
| 1. | GENERAL | N/A | Language around "size, nature and complexity" have been refined for further clarity throughout the measure. | Language refined to "commensurate with the size, complexity, structure, nature of business and risk profile of its operations" as follows: |
| | | | | Rule - Corporate Governance - Sections 3.3, 5.2.1 e), 5.6.2 c), 5.8.1 a), 5.12.2, 6.1 and 6.2 |
| 2. | The Authority acknowledges that regulated entities that are part of a group may be subject to group-wide governance practices. Where a regulated entity is part of a group, it may rely on the group corporate governance framework provided that the regulated entities' Governing Body is satisfied that the framework is appropriate in consideration of the | would be common in many regulated sectors. This is seldom found in the investment funds context, however, because the equivalent of 'group-level' policies are maintained by an investment manager, or administrator, or other service provider to the fund (rather than a parent). The Authority has long recognised this arrangement in other parts of its | proposed amendment. | Rule 3.3 revised to read as follows: The Authority acknowledges that regulated entities that are part of a group may be subject to group-wide governance practices, and that such entities may rely on service providers in respect of certain governance matters. Where a regulated entity is part of a group, it may rely on the group corporate governance framework provided that the regulated entities' Governing Body is satisfied that the framework is commensurate with the size, complexity, structure, nature of business and risk profile of its |

| | regulated entities' structure, business, risks and legal requirements in the Cayman Islands, including those outlined in this Rule. Where gaps are identified, a tailored corporate governance | The remainder of Rule 3.3 (correctly) makes clear that | | operations and legal requirements in the Cayman Islands, including those outlined in this Rule. Where gaps are identified, a tailored corporate governance framework that complies with the legal requirements in the Cayman Islands is required for regulated entities. |
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| | framework that complies | Suggested Amendment | | |
| | with the legal | The Authority and accorded as a that | | |
| | requirements in the Cavman Islands is | , , | | |
| | Cayman Islands is required for regulated | regulated entities that are part of a group may be subject to group- | | |
| | entities. | wide governance practices, <u>and</u> | | |
| | critics. | that regulated mutual funds and | | |
| | | private funds may rely on service | | |
| | | providers such as their investment | | |
| | | manager in respect of certain | | |
| | | governance matters | | |
| 3. | 3.3 | Rule 3.3: Consider if similar carve-out language used for MF/PFs is necessary for certain types of insurers (e.g., Class B). Reference any such language throughout measure and give similar consideration. | Revisions were made to Rule 3.3 accordingly. | mention of any specific entity/carve- outs, thereby making it applicable generally to entities which are subject to any group-wide governance practices. |
| 4. | The Authority acknowledges that regulated entities that are part of a group may be subject to group-wide governance practices. Where a regulated entity is part of a group, it may rely on the group corporate governance | , , | The Authority agrees to the proposed amendment for consistency with rule 3.2. | Rule 3.3 revised to read as follows: The Authority acknowledges that regulated entities that are part of a group may be subject to group-wide governance practices, and that such entities may rely on service providers in respect of certain governance matters. Where a regulated entity is part of a group, it may rely on the group corporate |

| | framework provided that the regulated entities' Governing Body is satisfied that the framework is appropriate in consideration of the regulated entities' structure, business, risks and legal requirements in the Cayman Islands, including those outlined in this Rule. Where gaps are identified, a tailored corporate governance framework that complies with the legal requirements in the Cayman Islands is required for regulated entities. | | | governance framework provided that the regulated entities' Governing Body is satisfied that the framework is appropriate in consideration of the regulated entities' commensurate with the structure, business, risks size, complexity, structure, nature of business, and risk profile of its operations and legal requirements in the Cayman Islands, including those outlined in this Rule. Where gaps are identified, a tailored corporate governance framework that complies with the legal requirements in the Cayman Islands is required for regulated entities. |
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| 5. | 4.1.1 The "Governing Body" of a regulated entity is the Board of Directors where the entity is a corporation, the General Partner where the entity is a partnership, the manager where the entity is a Limited Liability Company, the Board of Trustees where the entity is a trust business or the equivalent of such roles where the entity is another legal entity. | It is possible for a Cayman Islands incorporated limited liability company to not have managers, but it will always have someone discharging the equivalent function. Suggested Amendment The "Governing Body" of a regulated entity is the Board of Directors where the entity is a corporation, the General Partner where the entity is a partnership, the manager (or equivalent) where the entity is a Limited Liability Company, the Board of Trustees where the entity is a trust business or the equivalent of such | The Authority agrees to the proposed amendment. | Rule 4.1.1 revised to read as follows: The "Governing Body" of a regulated entity is the Board of Directors where the entity is a corporation, the General Partner where the entity is a partnership, the manager (or equivalent) where the entity is a Limited Liability Company, and the Board of Trustees where the entity is a trust business. or the equivalent of such roles where the entity is another legal entity. |

| | | roles where the entity is another legal entity. | | |
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| 6. | 4.1.1 | Section 4.1.1: The definition of "Governing Body" currently includes "manager (or equivalent) where an entity is a LLC" which is also applicable to PF/MF, however the definition of "Operator" in the PFA/MFA currently excludes any reference to LLCs. Consider language to clarify appropriate applicability of LLC governance to MFs/PFs in absence of supporting legislation. | The definition of "Governing Body" in the Rule and the definition of "Operators" in the SOG was amended for accuracy, clarity, and consistency between the two measures. | The definition of "Governing Body" in the Rule was amended as follows: "The "Governing Body" of a regulated entity is the Board of Directors where the entity is a corporation, the General Partner where the entity is a partnership, the manager (or equivalent) where the entity is a Limited Liability Company, and the Board of Trustees where the entity is a trust business." the Operator where the entity is a mutual fund or private fund or the equivalent of such roles where the entity is another legal entity. The definition of "Operator" in SoG was amended as follows: "The Operator is considered to be the 'Governing Body' of a Mutual Fund and a Private Fund and for the purposes of this SOG, the Operator is defined as "the Board of Directors where the entity is a corporation, the General |
| | | | | Partner where the entity is a |

| | | | | partnership, the manager (or equivalent) where the entity is a Limited Liability Company, and the Board of Trustees where the entity is a trust business". has the meaning ascribed to it under the Mutual Funds Act and the Private Funds Act. |
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| | | | | Additionally, a footnote was added to acknowledge the difference in definition of 'Operator' as provided in the SOG and that which is provided in the MFA and PFA: |
| | | | | "The Authority acknowledges the difference in the definition of an 'Operator' as provided in this SOG versus the MFA and PFA, and is making the requisite recommendation to amend the MFA & PFA to align the definitions." |
| 7. | 4.1.5 "Senior Management" includes the most senior staff of the regulated entity, including heads of divisions, and any person who fulfils the functions of a senior manager, by whatever name called. Such functions include | Rule 4.1.5 - Definitions "Senior Management" - Mutual Fund and Private Funds do not have any staff/very unlikely to be staffed. Suggest that this Rule only apply to MF/PFs to the extent they actually have any "Senior Management", otherwise MF/PFs should be exempt from any | For clarification, paragraph 4.1.5 as outlined in the proposed Rule is a definition and not a rule. Notwithstanding, the Authority acknowledges that all mutual funds and private funds may not have Senior Management but will rather rely on the "Governing Body" | No amendments are required. |

| | actively participating in the daily planning, supervision, administration and execution of a regulated entity's objectives and strategy. | | | |
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| 8. | A regulated entity must establish a Governing Body that is responsible for implementing a corporate governance framework that addresses, at a minimum | expectations / specify the required format of the corporate governance framework. Suggest CIMA provide guidance / | stipulate a set form for the governance framework. What the Authority requires is that the framework be commensurate with the entity's size, complexity, structure, nature of business and risk profile of its operations and that it meets the minimum requirement outlined in Rule 5.1.2 (a)-(n), | No amendments are required. |
| 9. | The Governing Body is responsible for, at a minimum: "establishing and overseeing the implementation of the entity's corporate culture, business objectives and strategies for achieving such objectives (including ongoing monitoring and evaluation), in line with the entity's long-term | CIMA to clarify what is meant by "corporate culture." Corporate Culture is a vague description. | culture is defined as: | No amendments are required. |

¹ IGI Global, https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/organizational-culture/21475; Development Dimensions International, https://www.ddiworld.com/blog/leadership-culture

| | interests and viability, including the legitimate | | | |
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| | interests of relevant stakeholders.' | | | |
| 10. | The Governing Body is responsible for, at a minimum: "ensuring the regulated entity conducts its affairs in accordance with the acts, regulations and rules of the Cayman Islands and the Authority; and" | suggested that this should be represented as part of the | The Authority agrees to the proposed amendment. | Rule 5.2.1(d) revised to read as follows: The Governing Body is responsible for, at a minimum: "ensuring the regulated entity conducts its affairs in accordance with the acts, regulations and rules of the Cayman Islands and the Authority, and where applicable, the entity's constitutional documents; and" |
| 11. | 5.2.1 (e) The Governing Body is responsible for, at a minimum: "ensuring the regulated entity adopts a management structure appropriate with its size, complexity, structure and risk profile." | Consideration should be given to inserting the phrase "nature of business" after "structure" and before "and risk profile". | The Authority agrees to the proposed amendment for consistency with rules 3.2 and 3.3. | Rule 5.2.1 (e) revised to read as follows: The Governing Body is responsible for, at a minimum: "ensuring the regulated entity adopts a management structure appropriate that is commensurate with its the size, complexity, structure, nature of business and risk profile of its operations." |

12. 5.3.1 (a)

The Governing Body must have on an on-going basis, at a minimum:

"an appropriate number of individuals with a diversity of skills, background, experience and expertise that have been approved by the Authority to ensure that there is an overall adequate level competence at the Governing Body."

There are certain regulated entities where the Governing Body does not require any approved individuals, most notably certain investment funds.

Suggested Amendment

"...an appropriate number of individuals with a diversity of skills, background, experience and expertise that have <u>all required approvals from</u> been approved by the Authority to ensure that there is an overall adequate level of competence at the Governing Body."

The Authority acknowledges approval may not be required for all Governing Body members and has clarified the rule to be agnostic of such approval requirement.

Additionally, expectations regarding the "appropriate number of individuals" has been clarified.

Rule 5.3.1 (a) revised to read as follows:

The Governing Body must have on an on-going basis, at a minimum:

"an appropriate number of individuals with a diversity of skills, background, experience and expertise that have been approved by the Authority to ensure that there is an overall adequate level of competence at the Governing Body."

Rule 5.3.1(a): "an appropriate Rule 5.3.1 (a) revised to read as number of individuals". follows: **Suggested Amendment** The Governing Body must have on an on-going basis, at a minimum: Sugaested wordina: appropriate number of individuals "an appropriate number of individuals, [being not less than two directors as required by the applicable in the case of a corporation, two regulatory acts and regulations, with a diversity of skills, background, managers in the case of an LLC, or two natural persons in the case of experience and expertise that have a General Partner, corporate been approved by the Authority to director or a Trustee or the ensure that there is an overall equivalent of such roles where the adequate level of competence at the entity is another legal entity. " Governing Body." Suggest we seek clarification from CIMA that:- (i) "an appropriate number of individuals" does not imply a minimum requirement of more than two directors / managers (in exempt company / LLC context), or two natural persons in respect of any GP / corporate director / Trustee of a MF / PF or equivalent where the entity is another entity. Rule 5.3.1(a): Does "approved by The Authority acknowledges the Authority" refer to Directors approval may not be required registered or licensed under for all Governing Body DRLA? members and has clarified the rule to be agnostic of such **Suggested Amendment** approval requirement. Suggested addition of "pursuant to the Directors Registration and Licencing Act (as amended)" after

the words "approved by the

Authority."

| | Rule 5.3.1(a): How much diversity | The Authority does not | No amendments are required. |
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| | can be expected in a board of 2 directors as required under CIMA guidance? Suggest CIMA to clarify expectations. | stipulate explicit diversity requirements for directors but expects regulated entities to ensure that the diversity across directors is commensurate with the entities' size, complexity, structure and risk profile. | no amenaments are required. |
| The Governing Body must have on an on-going basis, at a minimum: "appropriate documented internal governance practices and procedures to support the work of the Governing Body in a manner that promotes the efficient, objective and independent judgement and decision making by the Governing Body." | for Mutual and Private Funds. | The Authority expects referenced internal governance practices and procedures to be commensurate with the entities' size, complexity, structure and risk profile. A mutual fund or private fund may deem such practices and procedures to be appropriately captured in its Articles/applicable constitutional documents/PPM. | No amendments are required. |

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| 14. | The Governing Body must have on an on-going basis, at a minimum: "high standards of business conduct and ethical behaviour for Directors and Senior Management, including policies on conflict of interest, code of conduct, private transactions, self-dealing and preferential treatment of favoured internal and external entities." | interest, code of conduct, private transactions, self-dealing and preferential treatment of favoured internal and external entities" - CIMA to provide guidance / clarify | referenced policies to be commensurate with the entities' size, complexity, structure and risk profile. A regulated entity may deem the policies and procedures of service providers engaged for governance support to be sufficient. | No amendments are required. |

| 15. | 5.3.1 (f) The Governing Body must have on an on-going basis, at a minimum: "an appropriate succession plan for Directors and Senior Management." | In practice, funds' constitutional documents contain extensive provisions agreed with investors with respect to how members of the Governing Body (and the Governing Body itself, for partnerships) may be amended. We assume the Authority does not intend to require funds to depart from these principles, and thus suggest this footnote for clarification. Suggested Amendment an appropriate succession plan for Directors and Senior Management¹; [As new footnote:] For mutual funds and private funds, this obligation may be discharged by provisions in the fund's constitutional documents providing for the appointment and removal of Directors and/or Senior Management. | The Authority expects referenced succession planning to be commensurate with the entities' size, complexity, structure and risk profile. A mutual fund or private fund may deem such a succession plan to be appropriately captured in its Articles/applicable constitutional documents/PPM/service provider agreements. | No amendments are required. |
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| | | CIMA to provide guidance / clarify what the expectations are as to form and content of the succession plan. Does this need to be documented and applied at a Fund level? Suggest to CIMA that for independent service providers there is likely adequate coverage of this in their Directors Service Agreements/ Service Provider | The Authority expects referenced succession planning to be commensurate with the entities' size, complexity, structure and risk profile. A mutual fund or private fund may deem such a succession plan to be appropriately captured in its Articles/applicable constitutional | No amendments are required. |

| | | Agreements insofar as to consider the replacement of independent. | documents/PPM/service provider agreements. | |
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| 16. | 5.4.2 The Governing Body must oversee Senior Management (including the appointment and dismissal of senior managers), set appropriate performance standards for Senior Management and ensure that Senior Management is managing the affairs of the regulated entity in accordance with the strategies and objectives established by the Governing Body. | Consideration should be given to using the term "termination" instead of "dismissal". Consideration should be given to using the phrase "day-to-day operations" instead of the term "affairs". | The Authority agrees to the proposed amendment. | Rule 5.4.2 revised to read as follows: The Governing Body must oversee Senior Management (including the appointment and dismissal termination of senior managers), set appropriate performance standards for Senior Management and ensure that Senior Management is managing the affairs day-to-day operations of the regulated entity in accordance with the strategies and objectives established by the Governing Body. |
| 17. | The Governance Body must establish clear and objective independence criteria which should be met by its members to promote objectivity in decision making by the Governing Body. Rule 5.5.1 (footnote) The Authority recognizes that the Governing Body may consist of members from the parent | This language of the first substantive comment is taken from the Private Funds Act and reflects the relationship between mutual/private funds and their investment managers or advisors. The second substantive comment arises out of the common market-standard provision for regulated funds to agree with their investors that Governing Bodies may take into account a variety of factors, such as balancing the interest of one fund with other funds within | proposed amendment. | Footnote for rule 5.5.1 revised to read as follows: The Authority recognises that the Governing Body may consist of members from the parent company, group or business associates of the regulated entity (or, in the case of a mutual fund or a private fund, the parent company, group or business associates of any person providing, directly or indirectly, the investment management or investment advisory services with respect to such mutual fund or |

company, group or business associates of the regulated entity, but expects all members to exercise independent judgement and objectivity in the decision making of the Governing Body.

the same structure for the benefit of investors as a whole.

Strictly speaking, this could be regarded as not 'independent judgement' but it is judgement made with the full disclosure and consent of all investors. Moreover, the Exempted Limited Partnership Act and the Limited Liability Companies Act (each as amended) specifically provide for this ability to amend fiduciary duties. We therefore suggest this clarification as we assume it is not the Authority's intent to prohibit this common global industry market-standard practice.

Suggested Amendment

The Authority recognizes that the Governing Body may consist of members from the parent company, group or business associates of the regulated entity (or, in the case of a mutual fund or a private fund, the parent company, group or business associates of anv person providing, directly or indirectly, the investment management or investment advisory services with respect to such mutual fund or private fund), but expects all members to exercise independent judgement and objectivity in the decision making of the Governing Body, taking into account (where

private fund), but expects all members to exercise independent judgement and objectivity in the decision making of the Governing Body, taking into account (where relevant) factors required or permitted to be considered by the regulated entity's constitutional documents.

| | | relevant) factors required or permitted to be considered by the regulated entity's constitutional documents. | | |
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| | | Rule 5.5.1: "The Governance Body must establish clear and objective independence criteria". This is a step further than the 2013 SOG "exercise independent judgement". CIMA to clarify what they mean by "independence criteria", how will this be documented in practice and what would this likely entail. | referenced establishment of independence criteria to be commensurate with the entities' size, complexity, structure and risk profile, and should allow the Governance Body to exercise independent judgement in the ongoing exercise of its function. | |
| 18. | The Governance Body must establish clear and objective independence criteria which should be met by its members to promote objectivity in decision making by the Governing Body. | The term should be "Governing" not Governance". | The Authority agrees to the proposed amendment for consistency of verbiage used throughout the measure. | Rule 5.5.1 revised to read as follows: The Governingance Body must establish clear and objective independence criteria which should be met by its members to promote objectivity in decision making by the Governing Body. |
| 19. | Proposed new insertion. | 5.5.2 (new) Consideration should be given to inserting a new sub-rule which requires that the Governing Body document the independence criteria as it is met by its members. | required. | follows: The Governing Body must establish and document a clear and objective independence criterion which should be |

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| 20. | 5.6.1 | | The Authority agrees to the | |
| | The Governing Body, on | reporting notification how, when | proposed amendment. | follows: |
| | an ongoing basis, shall, at | etc. | | |
| | a minimum: | 1. What is deemed to be | | The Governing Body, shall, at a |
| | a) ensure that regulators | "substantial" | | minimum: |
| | are promptly notified of | 2. What is the expected | | a) ensure that the relevant regulator(s) |
| | substantive issues | mechanism to report the | | is promptly notified by email, within |
| | affecting the regulated | information | | ten days, of any substantive issues |
| | entity, in line with | 3. Define "promptly" | | which could materially affecting the |
| | applicable acts, rules, | | | regulated entity, in line with applicable |
| | regulations and | | | acts, rules, regulations and regulatory |
| | regulatory measures; | | | measures; |
| | b) comply promptly and | | | |
| | fully with requests for | | | |
| | information from the | | | |
| | Authority as required by | | | |
| | the regulatory acts; | | | |
| | c) enquire into the affairs | | | |
| | of the regulated entity | | | |
| | and request information | | | |
| | from management or | | | |
| | service providers, | | | |
| | including their presence | | | |
| | at board meetings where | | | |
| | necessary; and | | | |
| | d) ensure that the | | | |
| | business of the regulated | | | |
| | entity is conducted in | | | |
| | compliance with the | | | |
| | relevant acts, rules, | | | |
| | regulations and | | | |
| | regulatory measures in | | | |
| | force in the Cayman | | | |
| | Islands and in any | | | |
| | country in which the | | | |
| | regulated entity does | | | |
| | business. | | | |

| 21. | 5.6.1 (a) The Governing Body, on an ongoing basis, shall, at a minimum: "ensure that regulators are promptly notified of substantive issues affecting the regulated entity, in line with applicable acts, rules, regulations and regulatory measures" | Consider replacing the term "regulators" with "the Authority". | The Authority is of the view that the term "regulators" should remain as it captures all regulators (whether domestic or international) to which a regulated entity may have regulatory obligations. | Rule 5.6.1(a) revised to read as follows: "ensure that the relevant regulator(s) Authority is notified by email, within ten days, of any substantive issues which could materially affect the regulated entity, in line with applicable acts, rules, regulations and regulatory measures" |
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| 22. | 5.6.1 (a) The Governing Body, on an ongoing basis, shall, at a minimum: "ensure that regulators are promptly notified of substantive issues affecting the regulated entity, in line with applicable acts, rules, regulations and regulatory measures" | What is the difference between the term "applicable" in this subrule and "relevant" in sub-rule (d)? Consider using one term for purposes of consistency. | The Authority has reviewed Rule 5.6.1 (a) and (d) and made the necessary amended to ensure that the term "applicable" is used throughout the measure for consistency. | Rule 5.6.1 (d) revised accordingly for consistency. |
| 23. | 5.6.1 (d) The Governing Body, on an ongoing basis, shall, at a minimum: "ensure that the business of the regulated entity is conducted in compliance with the relevant acts, rules, regulations and regulatory measures in | Should the Authority concern themselves with whether or not a regulated entity is complying with relevant acts, rules, regulations and regulatory measures in any country which the regulated entity does business (other than the Cayman Islands)? | The Authority is of the view that while a regulated entity may be licensed or registered within the Cayman Islands, it may have operations in other countries, whose laws it should comply with as a matter of prudence and good governance. | No further amendments are required beyond stated directly above. |

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| | force in the Cayman | | | |
| | Islands and in any | | | |
| | country in which the | | | |
| | regulated entity does | | | |
| | business." | | | |
| 24. | 5.6.2 | Requiring a Licensee to review all | The Authority is of the opinion | No amendments are required. |
| 2-7. | The Governing Body shall | governing documents annually (as | that an annual requirement to | ino amenaments are required. |
| | 9 , | | | |
| | regularly, at a minimum | opposed to periodically) feels like | review and evaluate core | |
| | of once per year: | regulatory overreach. It is | components of a regulated | |
| | a) review the strategic | inconsistent with the notion of | entity's corporate framework | |
| | objectives and policies of | utilization of a Risk-based | is prudent in ensuring that any | |
| | the regulated entity | approach that CIMA has | associated risks can be | |
| | and either amend or | traditionally encouraged of its | identified and mitigated in a | |
| | readopt them as | licensees and also deviates from | timely and proactive manner, | |
| | appropriate; | CIMA practice to provide principle- | and reduces the risk exposure | |
| | b) evaluate the progress | based requirements rather than | | |
| | made towards achieving | prescriptive ones. | stakeholders. | |
| | the strategic objectives; | prescriptive ones. | stakenolders. | |
| | | | | |
| | c) review the composition | | | |
| | of the Governing Body to | | | |
| | ensure that collectively it | | | |
| | has sufficient knowledge, | | | |
| | skills, experience, | | | |
| | commitment and | | | |
| | independence to oversee | | | |
| | the regulated entity | | | |
| | effectively, considering | | | |
| | the size, complexity, | | | |
| | structure and risk | | | |
| | profile of the business of | | | |
| | the regulated entity. For | | | |
| | this purpose, the Board | | | |
| | should collectively and | | | |
| | | | | |
| | individually have, and | | | |
| | continue to maintain, | | | |
| | including through | | | |
| | training, necessary skills, | | | |
| | knowledge and | | | |
| | understanding of the | | | |

| regulated entity's | | |
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| business to be able to | | |
| fulfil its role. Depending | | |
| on the size, complexity, | | |
| structure and risk profile | | |
| of the business of the | | |
| regulated entity, a | | |
| Governing Body may | | |
| sometimes rely on the | | |
| advice of external | | |
| experts on one or more of | | |
| these areas. In that case, | | |
| the Governing Body | | |
| should nevertheless | | |
| collectively have the skills | | |
| and experience necessary | | |
| to understand and, where | | |
| appropriate, question and | | |
| challenge the advice of | | |
| such external expertise. | | |
| At all times, the | | |
| Governing Body must | | |
| effectively manage any | | |
| outsourced operations | | |
| including outsourced | | |
| management functions, | | |
| as applicable; | | |
| d) undertake self- | | |
| assessments of the | | |
| performance of the | | |
| governing body (as a | | |
| whole) and individual | | |
| members. Any | | |
| deficiencies identified | | |
| should remedied and | | |
| documented.; | | |
| e) review the | | |
| implementation of the | | |
| risk assessment and risk | | |
| HISK assessment and fisk | | |

| | management systems to ensure that all significant risks are being adequately measured, monitored and controlled; f) review the implementation of internal controls, ensuring they are operating effectively and that any deficiencies are adequately addressed; and g) where applicable, review the remuneration policy for Senior Management. | | | |
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| 25. | The Governing Body shall regularly, at a minimum of once per year: "review the implementation of the risk assessment and risk management systems to ensure that all significant risks are being adequately measured, monitored and controlled;2" | Consideration should be given to including "mitigated" in this subrule. | The Authority agrees that "mitigated" is the more generally accepted term used by industry as oppose to "controlled". | Rule 5.6.2 (e) revised to read as follows: The Governing Body shall regularly, at a minimum of once per year: "review the implementation of the risk assessment and risk management systems to ensure that all significant risks are being adequately measured, monitored and controlled mitigated;" |
| 26. | 5.7.1 Each Director of the Governing Body shall | Rule 5.7.1 " The Governing body shall indicate a time commitment expected from Non- | The Authority is of the opinion that establishing a minimum time commitment which is | No amendments are required. |

² Identified, assessed, monitor and mitigate the risks - this is verbiage used by FATF - https://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf

devote sufficient time to the role in support of effectively and efficiently executing associated responsibilities. The Governing Body shall indicate time commitment expected from Non-Executive Directors in letters of appointment. The Governing Body shall confirm to the Non-Executive Directors the on-aoina time commitment expected on an annual basis at the beginning of each financial year.

Executive Directors in letters of appointment. The Governing Body shall confirm to the Non-executive Directors the ongoing time commitment expected on an annual basis at the beginning of each financial year." - this should be removed. It is too difficult to predict the number of hours that are required for any particular Mutual or Private Fund by Non-executive directors as this will be heavily fact and circumstance specific.

This should be removed on the basis that you cannot predict the number of hours that are required for any particular Mutual or Private Fund by Non-executive directors, this will be heavily fact and circumstance specific. Directors owe duties of skill, care and diligence in the exercise of their powers and the conduct of the MF/PFs affairs in addition to fiduciary duties.

The remainder of the proposed Rule and draft SOG provides a framework of the expected diligence and devotion to the role. [Alternatively, expected minimum could be suggested by CIMA providing that these are deemed reasonable minimums commensurate on the size, complexity, structure and risk

mutually agreed upon by the regulated entity and appointed Non-Executive Directors, is prudent and will allow proactive consideration of resource needs of the entity in achieving its strategic objectives.

Further, the Authority acknowledges that this commitment may vary based on varying circumstances and expects that a regulated entity will make such determinations based on the size, complexity, structure and risk profile of its operations.

| Consider the verbiage used in the second- and third-line which references "indicate a time commitment" and "ongoing time commitment". The issue raised was that such verbiage has a quantitative inference which would be practically difficult to determine. A suggestion was made for alternative verbiage to be used such as "time needed to effectively execute fiduciary duties". Give due consideration and revise as appropriate. 28. 5.7.6 (Footnote) This addresses the same concern as outlined above in Rule 5.5.1. In the case of a PIC, the Governing Body must assess, at least every two (2) years, whether its relationship with the Segregated Portfolio Company ("SPC"), including in relation to listands law, and with full | | | profile of the regulated funds | | |
|---|-----|---|---|--|--|
| 27. 5.7.1 Rule 5.7.1: Rule 5.7.1: Rule amended to balance both the quantitative uncertainty of determining a specific time commitment on an annual basis at the begreated Portfolio Company ("SPC"), including in relation bit in commitment to consider the verbiage used in the second- and third-line which the quantitative uncertainty of determining a specific time commitment vs. the need for the quantitative uncertainty of determining a specific time commitment vs. the need for the quantitative uncertainty of determining a specific time commitment vs. the need for regulatory certainty that enough time is given to such a simple commitment vs. the need for regulatory certainty that enough time is given to such in support of effectiveness. Rule 5.7.1 amended to follows: Rule 5.7.1 amended to follows: Rule 5.7.1 amended to in the quantitative uncertainty of determining a specific time commitment vs. the need for regulatory certainty that enough time is given to such as given | | | | | |
| Consider the verbiage used in the second- and third-line which references "indicate a time commitment" and "ongoing time commitment". The issue raised was that such verbiage has a quantitative inference which would be practically difficult to determine. A suggestion was made for alternative verbiage to be used such as "time needed to effectively execute fiduciary duties". Give due consideration and revise as appropriate. 28. 5.7.6 (Footnote) This addresses the same concern as outlined above in Rule 5.5.1. In the case of a PIC, the Governing Body must assess, at least every two (2) years, whether its relationship with the Segregated Portfolio Company ("SPC"), including in relation to listands law, and with full | | | operations. | | |
| This addresses the same concern as outlined above in Rule 5.5.1. This addresses the same concern as outlined above in Rule 5.5.1. The purpose of this Rule is to ensure that Directors of the Governing Body prioritise the interests of the regulated entity and relevant stakeholders but does not preclude such Directors from considering other interests as the constitutional documents are required. The purpose of this Rule is to ensure that Directors of the Governing Body prioritise the interests of the regulated entity and relevant stakeholders but does not preclude such Directors from considering other interests as the constitutional documents of the fund permit. | 27. | 5.7.1 | Consider the verbiage used in the second- and third-line which references "indicate a time commitment" and "ongoing time commitment". The issue raised was that such verbiage has a quantitative inference which would be practically difficult to determine. A suggestion was made for alternative verbiage to be used such as "time needed to effectively execute fiduciary duties". Give due consideration | the quantitative uncertainty of determining a specific time commitment vs. the need for regulatory certainty that enough time is given to such roles in support of | "Each Director of the Governing Body shall devote time to the role needed for effective and efficient execution of associated responsibilities. The Governing Body shall indicate a minimum time commitment expected from Non-Executive Directors in letters of appointment, noting that such time commitment may change given the needs of the regulated entity, which may change from time to time. The Governing Body shall confirm to the Non-Executive Directors the on-going minimum time commitment expected on an annual basis at the beginning of |
| Company ("SPC"), provided for under Cayman the constitutional documents including in relation to Islands law, and with full of the fund permit. | 28. | In the case of a PIC, the Governing Body must assess, at least every two (2) years, whether its | as outlined above in Rule 5.5.1. In the absence of this clarification, there is scope for legitimate and | ensure that Directors of the Governing Body prioritise the interests of the regulated entity and relevant stakeholders but does not | |
| management structure or governance, is in the best interests of the Suggested Amendment | | Company ("SPC"), including in relation to the insurance manager, management structure or governance, is in the best | provided for under Cayman Islands law, and with full disclosure to investors) inadvertently breaching this rule. | the constitutional documents | |

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| | If the majority of | " <u>In the case of a mutual fund or</u> | | |
| | Directors and senior | private fund, Directors or | | |
| | managers of the PIC are | Governing Bodies may consider | | |
| | the same as those of the | <u>such other interests as the</u> | | |
| | SPC, this assessment | constitutional documents of the | | |
| | must be carried out in | fund permit, provided always that | | |
| | writing on an annual | they act in accordance with all | | |
| | basis. | applicable fiduciary duties." | | |
| 29. | New subrule 5.7.9 | Please refer to Industry's | Further to Industry's | New subrule 5.7.9 added to read as |
| | added to read as | comment in 5.14.1 below. | comments noted in 5.14.1 | follows: |
| | follows: | | below, the Authority decided | |
| | | | to add this new subrule as this | Each Director of the Governing Body |
| | Each Director of the | | requirement is more | must ensure that they are not subject |
| | Governing Body must | | appropriately placed under the | to undue influence from Senior |
| | ensure it is they are not | | section titled "Duties of | Management or other parties and that |
| | subject to undue | | Individual Directors of the | it has they have access to all relevant |
| | influence from Senior | | Governing Body". | information about the regulated entity |
| | Management or other | | | , |
| | parties and that it has | | | |
| | they have access to all | | | |
| | relevant information | | | |
| | about the regulated | | | |
| | entity | | | |
| 30. | 5.8.1 | Global change: Replace the term | The Authority agrees to the | All applicable references to "board" in |
| | Sub-committees: The | "board" with "Governing Body". | proposed amendment for | the measure have been revised to |
| | Governing Body may | Bourd With Governing Body . | consistency. | "Governing Body". |
| | establish sub-committees | | consistency. | doverning body . |
| | to carry out delegated | | | |
| | powers, duties, and | | | |
| | functions in respect of | | | |
| | certain matters. | | | |
| | Established sub- | | | |
| | committees are | | | |
| | accountable to the board | | | |
| | but should not relieve the | | | |
| | | | | |
| | board of any of its | | | |
| | responsibilities. | | | |

| 31. | 5.8.1 | Rule 5.8.1: Suggested that Footnote 4 be relocated to 5.8.1 b). Give due consideration and revise as appropriate. | Footnote relocated as suggested. | No changes to verbiage. |
|-----|--|--|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 32. | 5.8.1(a): Sub-committees: The Governing Body may establish sub-committees to carry out delegated powers, duties, and functions in respect of certain matters. Established sub-committees are accountable to the board but should not relieve the board of any of its responsibilities: "Where the Governing Body establishes sub-committees to conduct certain functions, the number and types of sub-committees established should be appropriate the size, complexity, structure and risk profile of the regulated entity. Each established sub-committee, as applicable, | "Where the Governing Body establishes sub-committees to conduct certain functionsmust have a charter of terms or reference or other instrument (whether contained within corporate resolutions, minutes or as may otherwise be documented [by the regulated entity]) that sets out its mandate, scope, accountability, reporting obligations and working procedures" | proposed amendment but | No amendments are required. |

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| | must have a charter of | | | |
| | terms of reference or | | | |
| | other instrument that | | | |
| | sets out its mandate, | | | |
| | scope, accountability, | | | |
| | reporting obligations and | | | |
| | working procedures. Sub- | | | |
| | committees must | | | |
| | maintain appropriate | | | |
| | records (for example, | | | |
| | meeting minutes or | | | |
| | summary of matters | | | |
| | reviewed and decisions | | | |
| | taken) of their | | | |
| | deliberations and | | | |
| | decisions. Such records | | | |
| | should document the | | | |
| | committees' fulfilment of | | | |
| | their responsibilities and | | | |
| | help with the assessment | | | |
| | of committee | | | |
| | effectiveness by the | | | |
| | Governing Body or those | | | |
| | responsible for the | | | |
| | internal control | | | |
| | functions." | | | |
| 33. | 5.8.1 (b) | We suggest the footnote would | The Authority agrees to the | New footnote added to 5.8.1(b) to |
| | Sub-committees: The | provide an appropriate and | proposed amendment due to | read as follows: |
| | Governing Body may | proportionate route to compliance | the unique nature of funds. | 1000 00 101101101 |
| | establish sub-committees | with 5.8.1(b) for investment | and amque nature or rands. | |
| | to carry out delegated | funds, taking into account the | | For mutual funds or private funds, |
| | powers, duties, and | nature, scale and complexity of | | taking into account the size, |
| | functions in respect of | their business and structure, | | complexity, structure, nature of |
| | certain matters. | which is different to that of other | | business and risk profile of their |
| | Established sub- | regulated entities. We note that | | business, this obligation may be |
| | committees are | they already have three anti- | | discharged by the Governing Body |
| | accountable to the board | money laundering officers | | receiving a report directly from the |
| | but should not relieve the | registered with the Authority, and | | fund's anti-money laundering |
| | bat should not relieve the | will have Cayman Islands and | | compliance officer, or from another |
| | 1 | wiii nave Cayman Islanus anu | | compliance officer, or from another |

board of any of its responsibilities:

"The Governing Body must have in place an appropriate Compliance Committee or person who reports directly and timely to the Governing Body on all compliance matters (the nature, scale and complexity of the regulatory entity's business can be used as a guide as to whether an appropriate compliance committee or person is most suitable."

onshore legal counsel, as well as legal counsel of their investment manager / adviser, all of whom already will report to the Governing at board Bodv meetings. The Governing Body will also receive reports from the investment fund's service providers, who will themselves have compliance personnel. additional Appointing an Compliance Committee or person would significantly overlap with the existing functions and would be unnecessary as well as adding a Cavman Islands specific additional cost. We note the Authority's draft Statement of Guidance Corporate on Governance for Mutual Funds and Private Funds appears acknowledge how fund operators currently keep informed with respect to these matters at draft section 4.3 of the SOG.

Suggested Amendment

"[As new footnote:] For mutual funds or private funds, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of their business, this obligation may be discharged by the Governing Body receiving a report directly from the fund's anti-money laundering compliance officer, or from another suitably qualified compliance or legal professional, not less than

suitably qualified compliance or legal professional, not less than annually and on an ad hoc, timely basis, as appropriate.

| | | annually and on an ad hoc basis timely basis as appropriate." | | |
|-----|--|---|--|-----------------------------|
| 34. | 5.8.1 (b) Sub-committees: The Governing Body may establish sub-committees to carry out delegated powers, duties, and functions in respect of certain matters. Established sub-committees are accountable to the board but should not relieve the board of any of its responsibilities. The Governing Body must have in place an appropriate Compliance Committee or person who reports directly and timely to the Governing Body on all compliance matters (the nature, scale and complexity of the regulatory entity's business can be used as a guide as to whether an appropriate compliance committee or person is most suitable). | This sub-rule refers to the "nature, scale and complexity of the regulated entity's business". Consideration should be given to changing this to refer to the "size, complexity, structure and risk profile", as noted elsewhere in the document. Replace the term "regulatory" with "regulated". | The Authority agrees to the proposed amendment for consistency. | |
| 35. | The Governing Body shall establish a documented 'conflicts of interest' policy for its members, which shall at a | Rule 5.10.2(b) "review or approval process for members to follow before they engage in certain activities (such as serving on another board)" - This is impractical for independent | acknowledgement that independent director service providers may serve on several Boards, the Authority | No amendments are required. |

| | minimum, include the following: "a review or approval process for members to follow before they engage in certain activities (such as serving on another board) to ensure that such activity will not create a conflict of interest." | director service providers. Suggest this clause should not apply to independent director service providers. The number of boards and new boards that independent service providers engage on would make this a prohibitive amount of administration. Suggest this be removed for Mutual and Private Funds insofar as relative to an independent director serving on another board. CIMA to provide guidance on what "certain activities" will be deemed to constitute. | regulated entities to have a mechanism which allows for adequate oversight of conflicts of interest at the Governing Body level. Within the context of the Rule, "certain activities" speak to a number of possible circumstances which may result in a conflict of interest for a member of the Governing Body. | |
|-----|---|--|---|---|
| 36. | The Governing Body shall establish a documented 'conflicts of interest' policy for its members, which shall at a minimum, include the following: "a member's responsibility to abstain from voting on any matter where the member may have a conflict of interest or where the member's objectivity or ability to properly fulfil duties to the regulated entity may be otherwise compromised" | Understood that a director of a company must not put himself in a position where there is an actual or potential conflict between his duty to the company and his personal interests or a duty owed to another person, including a shareholder whom the director represents on the board. However, it is open to the company, as beneficiary of the fiduciary power, to waive a particular conflict where given by the company in general meeting (i.e. the shareholders by a majority vote, once the director has made full disclosure of the conflict or potential conflict). Invariably a company's articles of association will also provide that, if a director discloses his or her interest to the board at or before | The Authority agrees to the principle of the proposed amendment. | Rule 5.10.2 (d) revised to read as follows: a member's responsibility to abstain from voting (unless otherwise allowed by Articles of Association or constitutional documents) on any matter where the member may have a conflict of interest or where the member's objectivity or ability to properly fulfil duties to the regulated entity may be otherwise compromised; |

| | the meeting at which a particular matter is to be considered, he or she may vote in respect of that matter, notwithstanding that he is interested in such matter. Suggest that for companies, Rules 5.10.2(d) and 5.10.4 be subject to the provisions of the Articles and similarly, for ELP's/LLCs and Unit Trusts, these Rules be subject to the provisions of the applicable constitutional documents. | | |
|---|---|---|--|
| The Governing Body must establish an audit committee or equivalent that is appropriate with the size, complexity, and structure of the regulated entity. The audit committee or equivalent is chiefly responsible for the financial reporting process; providing oversight of the regulated entity internal and external auditors; approving or recommending to the Board for their approval, the appointment, compensation and dismissal of auditors; reviewing and approving the audit scope and frequency; receiving key audit reports and ensuring that Senior Management is taking the | Replace the term "board" with "Governing Body". | The Authority agrees to the proposed amendment for consistency. | All applicable references to "board" in the measure have been revised to "Governing Body". |

| necessary corrective | | |
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| actions in a timely | | |
| manner to address | | |
| control weaknesses, non- | | |
| compliance with and | | |
| regulations, and other | | |
| | | |
| problems identified by | | |
| auditors. | | |
| Additionally, the audit | | |
| committee or equivalent | | |
| should oversee the | | |
| establishment of | | |
| accounting policies and | | |
| practices by the | | |
| regulated entity. The | | |
| Board is responsible for | | |
| oversight of the audit | | |
| committee or equivalent. | | |

| 20 | 5.10.4 | Most private funds and many | The Authority agrees with the | Rule 5.10.4 revised to read as |
|-----|----------------------------|--|---------------------------------|---|
| 38. | | Most private funds and many | | follows: |
| | | mutual funds deal with conflicts by | proposed amendment. | follows: |
| | interest arises, a member | way of independent Limited Partner Advisory Committees | | Subject to any express provisions |
| | must recuse himself or | _ | | Subject to any express provisions set out in the regulated entity's |
| | herself at the earliest | , | | Articles of Association or |
| | opportunity from a Board | , | | constitutional documents, where a |
| | meeting and refrain from | and require LPAC approval of | | conflict of interest arises, a member of |
| | deliberating on any | various conflict situations. We | | the Governing Body must recuse |
| | matter giving rise to such | therefore suggest this clarification | | himself or herself at the earliest |
| | conflicts" | as we assume it is not the | | opportunity from a Board meeting and |
| | | Authority's intent to prohibit this | | refrain from deliberating on any matter |
| | | common practice, which has | | giving rise to such conflicts. |
| | | arisen in conjunction with the | | |
| | | requirements of investors over | | |
| | | time. In particular, a strict | | |
| | | obligation on members of | | |
| | | Governing Bodies to recuse | | |
| | | themselves where conflicted is | | |
| | | broader than the standard | | |
| | | common law position which | | |
| | | requires any interested party to | | |
| | | declare any interest. | | |
| | | | | |
| | | Suggested Amendment | | |
| | | Precede with "Subject to any | | |
| | | express or implied provisions set | | |
| | | out in the regulated entity's | | |
| | | constitutional documents or (if | | |
| | | any) offering documents,". | | |
| | | | | |
| | | As above - suggest deleting or | The Authority is of the view | Please see amendment directly above. |
| | | making subject to the applicable | that it cannot be deleted as it | |
| | | MF/PF's constitutional documents. | applies to regulated entities. | |

39. 5.10.6 (a)

The Governing Body must abide by a Code of Conduct that is based on the following key principles:

"Directors should act solely in the interest of the regulated entity and relevant stakeholders. They should not under any circumstances do any act with the purpose of gaining any financial or other consideration for themselves, their family or friends."

This wording more closely follows the typical expression of directors' fiduciary duties under Cayman Islands law. There are many ordinary course and legitimate acts that Directors will do that might inadvertently breach this Rule as drafted – they might have a shareholding in the entity, their remuneration might be connected to its success, and so on. Regulated entities' constitutional documents will typically already contain extensive provisions dealing with director conflicts of interest, which would ordinarily already take these sorts of ancillary conflicts into account. If Rule the draft introduces additional duties that conflict with the provisions of an investment fund's constitutional documents or go beyond the standards required in Cayman Islands statutes, this is likely to introduce significant and unwelcome compliance costs. Moreover, these costs will not apply to non-Cayman Islands entities within the same investment fund structure, introducing inconsistencies and harming the jurisdiction's competitiveness.

Suggested Amendment

Directors should act solely in the interest of the regulated entity and relevant stakeholders. They

The Authority agrees to the proposed amendment.

Rule 5.10.6 (a) revised to read as follows:

The Governing Body must abide by a Code of Conduct that is based on the following key principles:

Directors must act solely in the interest of the regulated entity and relevant stakeholders. They should not under any circumstances, do any act with the **primary** purpose of gaining any financial or other consideration for themselves, their family or friends.

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| | | should not under any circumstances do any act with the | | |
| | | <u>primary</u> purpose of gaining any financial or other consideration for | | |
| | | themselves, their family or | | |
| | | friends. | | |
| 40. | 5.11 Remuneration Policy and Practices | The Authority will recognise that its existing rules already contain extensive provisions requiring funds to disclose the remuneration structures of their Governing Body and other key service providers, and that these structures are often extensively negotiated with investors individually and collectively to ensure an appropriate balance and alignment of interests between investors and service providers, consistent with other jurisdictions and in line with global industry standard. It is submitted these existing arrangements, supported by the Authority's existing rules and guidance in respect of disclosure of these matters, are sufficient. Additional provisions restricting parties' ability to agree appropriate remuneration | that this Rule does not preclude negotiation of remuneration premised on | No amendments are required. |
| | | provisions may harm the jurisdiction's competitiveness. | | |
| | | Suggested Amendment | | |
| | | [As new footnote]: | | |
| | | For regulated entities that are mutual funds under the Mutual | | |
| | | Funds Act or private funds under | | |

| | | the Private Funds Act, this Rule 5.11 shall not apply. | | |
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| 41. | 5.11.1 The Governing Body must adopt and oversee the effective implementation of a written remuneration policy. The remuneration policy must: (i) not induce excessive or inappropriate risk taking; (ii) align with the corporate culture, objectives, strategies, identified risk appetite and long-term interests of the regulated entity; and (iii) have proper regard to the interests of relevant stakeholders. | CIMA to clarify expectations on | The remuneration policy is expected to ensure an appropriate balance and alignment of interests between those providing governance, oversight and management of the regulated entity and other relevant stakeholders such as shareholders and investors. | No amendments are required. |
| 42. | 5.13.3 The Governing Body must hold regular board meetings, not less than annually. | are formed under the laws of other | The Authority agrees to the proposed amendment. | Rule 5.13.3 revised to read as follows: The Governing Body must hold regular meetings, at least annually. Where the Governing Body is not comprised by a board, its principals or other natural person who exercise ultimate control over the regulated entity should meet at least annually. |

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| | | Suggested Amendment | | |
| | | The Governing Body must hold regular board meetings, not less than annually. Where the | | |
| | | Governing Body is not controlled by a board, its principals or other | | |
| | | natural person who exercise ultimate control should meet not less than annually. | | |
| 43. | 5.14.1 The Governing Body must ensure it is not subject to | section implies it is Senior | comment and will move this rule to the section titled | New subrule 5.7.9 added to read as follows: |
| | undue influence from Senior Management or | , | "Duties of Individual Directors of the Governing Body". | Each Director of the Governing Body must ensure that it is they are not |
| | other parties and that it has access to all relevant | l | | subject to undue influence from Senior Management or other parties and that |
| | information about the regulated entity. | · | | it has they have access to all relevant information about the regulated entity. |
| 44. | 5.14.2 The Governing Body must approve appropriate policies and procedures to ensure that Senior | Rule 5.14.2 See comment above re Rule 4.5.1, "Senior Management" not applicable to | | No amendments are required. |
| | Management: a) is sufficiently accountable to the | | Body" for the day-to-day management of the fund. Rules should be applied in | |
| | Governing Body; b) carries out the day- | Management", otherwise MF/PFs should be exempt from any | consideration of size, complexity, structure and risk | |
| | to-day operations of the regulated entity | applicable to "Senior | profile of operations of the regulated entity. | |
| | effectively and in accordance with the entity's corporate | Management". | | |
| | culture, business objectives and | | | |
| | strategies for | | | |

| | achieving such | | | |
|-----|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | objectives, in line | | | |
| | with the entity's long- | | | |
| | term interests and | | | |
| | viability, including the | | | |
| | legitimate interests of | | | |
| | relevant | | | |
| | stakeholders; | | | |
| | , | | | |
| | c) promotes sound risk | | | |
| | management, | | | |
| | compliance and fair | | | |
| | treatment of relevant | | | |
| | stakeholders | | | |
| | d) provides the | | | |
| | Governing Body | | | |
| | adequate and timely | | | |
| | information to enable | | | |
| | the Governing Body | | | |
| | to carry out its duties | | | |
| | and functions | | | |
| | including the | | | |
| | monitoring and | | | |
| | review of the | | | |
| | performance and risk | | | |
| | exposures of the | | | |
| | regulated entity, and | | | |
| | the performance of | | | |
| | Senior Management; | | | |
| | and; | | | |
| | , | | | |
| | e) maintains adequate | | | |
| | and orderly records of | | | |
| | the internal | | | |
| | organization that can | | | |
| | be easily accessed. | | | |
| 45. | 6.1. | Clarity is needed how they expect | | No amendments are required. |
| | Regulated entities must, | licensees to demonstrate the | adequacy and effectiveness of | |
| | as required by the | effectiveness of their Corporate | the corporate framework, as | |
| | Authority, demonstrate | Governance framework. If it is left | required by the Authority, will | |
| | the adequacy and | to the licensee to decide how they | depend on the specific nature | |
| | | <u>'</u> | | |

| | effectiveness of its corporate governance framework. As deemed suitable, the Authority will exercise supervisory judgement when assessing such adequacy and effectiveness based on the size, complexity, structure, and risk profile of the regulated entity. | effectiveness, then this should be explicitly stated. In the event this is the case, some guidance would still be appreciated. | relating the framework and is not intended to be a prescriptive undertaking. | |
|-----|---|--|--|---|
| 46. | Where a regulated entity is of the view that a particular rule (or application of a rule) is not applicable to the entity based on the size, complexity, structure, and risk profile of its operations, it is the responsibility of the entity to ensure this is comprehensively demonstrated to the Authority, as needed | "Suggest the Authority prescribes a form of letter for which reporting | a regulated entity will be at the discretion of the entity and | · |